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Summarya 
There is evidence in the economic literature that restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortion 
reduces the demand for abortion. The unresolved question is whether such restrictions also 
increase safe sex (that is, pregnancy avoidance) behavior among women. This study 
explores that issue using state-level gonorrhea rates among women for 1975-95. The 
rationale is that sexual behavior that leads to greater risk of accidental pregnancies is likely 
to be highly correlated with sexual behavior leading to greater risk of STD infection. Since 
gonorrhea has an incubation period of about a week, and is transmitted almost exclusively 
through sexual intercourse, a change in sexual behavior should soon be followed by a 
change in gonorrhea rates. The study used a partial adjustment model with lagged 
dependent variables estimated using Arellano-Bond’s GMM method. Results fail to find any 
statistically significant evidence that Medicaid funding restrictions are effective in reducing 
gonorrhea rates. This finding is robust to a variety of alternate specifications and tests. This 
suggests that restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortion fail to promote safe sex behavior 
among women.  
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1. Introduction: 
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Roe vs. Wade established the constitutional right 
of women to abort a pregnancy. The decision made it illegal for states to implement laws 
prohibiting women from obtaining abortions, but left considerable ambiguity regarding the 
authority of a state to impose restrictions  that could curtail a woman’s ability to do so.  The 
issue became particularly contentious with the 1976 Hyde Amendment passed by the 
Congress, which cut off federal Medicaid funding for most abortion procedures and left 
Medicaid funding for abortion to the states’ discretion. Many states proceeded to restrict on 
Medicaid funding for abortion procedures, though in some cases this was temporarily over-
turned by judicial decisions. However, in 1981 a Supreme Court ruling  established the full 
right of the states to restrict Medicaid funding for abortion procedures if they so chose.  
 
Needless to say, the issue of Medicaid funding restrictions on abortion remains  
controversial. Therefore, it seems useful to determine from a public policy perspective what 
real impacts the Medicaid funding restriction may have. There is a considerable body of 
literature offering evidence that such restrictions do, in fact, reduce the demand for legal 
abortions. However, there is much ambiguity in empirical findings regarding whether such 
restrictions increase the incidence of unplanned births. The literature that tests this 
hypothesis using actual birth incidences yields conflicting results, and the studies that 
attempt to directly explore the effects of such behavior on individual sexual activity are 
hampered by data restrictions. Hence, this work proposes an alternate angle of investigation, 
and looks at whether  Medicaid restrictions have any effect on the rates of sexually 
transmitted disease, hereafter referred to as STD, among women. b 
 
 If Medicaid funding restrictions do, indeed, reduce the rates of sexually transmitted 
diseases, then this implies that such restrictions inhibit the kind of risky sexual activities that 
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cause such diseases (or conversely, the availability of Medicaid funding encourages the kind 
of risky sexual activities that causes such diseases). Hence, the findings of this study help 
serve two purposes. First and more importantly, they provide an indirect but reasonably 
convincing test of whether Medicaid funding restrictions encourage safe sex behavior. 
Second, they directly test whether Medicaid funding restrictions generate positive 
externalities by reducing the societal health cost burden of high STD rates.  It is worth noting 
that STD rates have previously been utilized to proxy ‘risky’ sexual behavior in the health 
science literature  (e.g. Scribner et al, 1998)1, but to the author’s knowledge, they have been 
used in that capacity in the economic literature by only one study -- Chesson et al, (2000) 2. 
 
The STD used here is gonorrhea rates among women – a disease with a very short 
incubation period which is transmitted almost entirely through sexual intercourse. The period 
covered is 1975-95, and the model used is one of partial adjustment with lagged dependent 
variables. The results uniformly fail to find evidence that Medicaid funding restrictions reduce 
gonorrhea rates among women with any statistical significance. Hence, this study is unable 
to offer support for such funding restrictions on either the grounds that they reduce the cost 
burden of STDs, or the grounds that they seem to promote safe sex behavior.  
 
2. Previous Research: 
2.1 Theoretical Discussion: 
Conventional wisdom might hold that restrictions on abortion that raise the price of abortion 
affect a woman’s choices after a pregnancy has occurred, and might increase the probability 
of the pregnancy being carried to term. However, a pregnancy is rarely an exogenous event. 
Rather, it is an outcome of prior decisions made regarding sexual intercourse and 
contraception use. Thus, increased access to abortion procedures, via lowering the 
opportunity cost of unwanted pregnancies, could increase the incidence of behaviors that 
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heighten the risk of unwanted pregnancies, while reduced access to abortion procedures 
could decrease the incidence of the same. Hence, the net effect of abortion restrictions on 
childbearing depends on the stage at which women factor in the restriction into their 
decision-making process.  If it is only after the pregnancy has already occurred, then the 
restrictions should negatively affect the number of abortions but not the number of 
pregnancies -- and thus increase the number of unplanned births.  On the other hand, if it is 
during initial decision-making about sexual intercourse and contraception use, then the 
restrictions could negatively affect both the number of initial pregnancies as well as the 
number of abortions thereafter, so that the eventual net effect on childbearing is ambiguous. 
 
This study suggests an indirect method to gauge whether women factor in the presence of 
Medicaid funding restrictions in decisions regarding sexual activity and contraception. 
Behaviors that leads to STD infections and behaviors that leads to accidental pregnancies 
are, in many ways, positively correlated.  Examples are sexual intercourse at relatively 
young ages, non-monogamous sexual relationships, unprotected sexual intercourse, and so 
forth. If restrictions on abortion influence women’s choices only after the occurrence of a 
pregnancy, then they will not affect any of the above behaviors and should not impact STD 
rates. However, if the restrictions influence women’s choices regarding sex and 
contraception and encourage safe sex behavior, then they should simultaneously reduce 
STD rates. Hence, the effect (or lack thereof) of restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortion 
on STD rates provide indirect but reasonably convincing indications of the effectiveness of 
those restrictions in promoting safe sex behavior.  
 
2.2. Existing Empirical Work: 
Economic studies have considered the impact of Medicaid funding restrictions for abortion 
on the abortion rates at state or county levels (Blank et al, 1996;3 Levine et al, 1996;4 Haas-
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Wilson, 1996;5 Kane & Staiger, 1996; 6 Matthews et al, 1997;7) as well as on the probability 
of individual women getting an abortion (Lundberg & Plotnick. 1995;8 Levine et. Al, 1996). By 
an large, the results indicate that the presence of Medicaid restrictions negatively affect 
state/county abortion rates and probability of abortion for individual respondents. Thus, there 
is reasonable evidence to support the hypothesis that Medicaid funding restrictions affect 
pregnancy resolution choices. The next question is, do such restrictions also affect choices 
pertaining to sexual and contraception behavior?  One method is to the effect of such 
restrictions on actual birth outcomes. If the restrictions reduce the likelihood of abortion but 
not the likelihood of a pregnancy, then they should be accompanied by an increase in 
birthrates. On the other hand, no increase or a decrease in birthrates (in conjunction with 
reductions in abortion rates) would imply increases in pregnancy-avoidance behavior. 
Empirical results on this issue are rather ambiguous. Evans et al (1993)9 find faster 
increases in birthrates in a state with Medicaid funding restrictions compared to states 
without. However, Levine et al  and Matthews et al find that Medicaid funding restrictions 
have either negative or insignificant effects on birth-rates, depending on the model 
specification. Kane and Staiger find a negative effect on birthrates for white women, but a 
positive effect for black women. On the other hand, Currie et al. (1996)10 use individual level 
data from NLSY79 and find positive effects on birth probabilities for all racial and income 
groups; Tomal (1999)11 uses county-level data from 12 states and finds higher birthrates 
among teens;  and Cook et al (1999)12 find that inadequacy of abortion funds in the state of 
North Carolina has positive and significant effects on birthrates for some groups and 
insignificant effects for the others in that state. Hence, there is no clear consensus on 
whether Medicaid funding restrictions actually promote pregnancy-avoidance behavior. 
 
An alternate route is to directly consider the impact of Medicaid funding restrictions on 
sexual activity and contraception use. Three studies (Argys et al, 1999;13 Sen, 1999;14 
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Levine, 2001 15) investigate the effect of Medicaid restrictions on adolescent sexual activity. 
The consensus is that Medicaid restrictions do not appear to lead to more abstinence or 
more diligent contraception use. However, studies using individual-level data to investigate 
determinants of sexual activity are typically plagued by problems of misreporting of actual 
sexual activity. Furthermore, the cross-sectional nature of the data used by Argys et al 
(NSFG, year 1995) and Sen (NLSY97, year 1997) lead to concerns about endogeneity 
between Medicaid restrictions and unobserved state attitudes. Levine uses YRBS data for 
multiple years between the late 1980s and 1990s, but is hindered by the fact that very few 
states actually changed Medicaid laws within that period. Hence the effects of the 
restrictions are, for the greater part, subsumed within the state fixed effects. Thus, there 
remains considerable scope for exploring the effect of Medicaid restrictions on sexual activity 
from another angle – its effects on state STD rates.  
 
3. Data : 
3.1. STD Rates: 
The data set covers the 20 year period of 1975 to 1995. Data for gonorrhea rates (calculated 
per 100,000 female population) are obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), which records state surveillance reports of these cases.c Gonorrhea is a 
bacterial diseases that, besides mother-to-infant, are transmitted only through sexual 
intercourse. The incubation period is typically less than 2 weeks. Figure 1 shows the over-all 
female gonorrhea rates in the country over 1975-95. Figure 2 shows the age-specific 
gonorrhea rates among women in 1995. Note that the rates are the highest among 
adolescents and young adults, verifying that the age-groups most susceptible to gonorrhea 
coincide with age-groups most at risk of unplanned, pre-marital pregnancies, and hence 
potentially most affected by restrictions on abortion access. 
 
 6
 
 
The CDC warns that, because of different policies regarding reporting of infectious STDs 
among private and public clinics, there may be a bias towards reporting of incidences among 
groups more likely to use public STD clinics. However, this is not a disadvantage in this 
study. Because there is likely to be a positive correlation between the probability of using a 
public STD clinic and the probability of Medicaid eligibility, this actually diminishes any 
concerns about whether Medicaid funding restrictions are relevant to the populations from 
whom the STD data are obtained. It should be noted, though, that this bias in data reporting 
could  lead to an over-estimation of the impact of Medicaid funding restrictions on STD rates 
for the whole population of women. 
 
3.2. Medicaid Restrictions: 
My data on the history of Medicaid funding restrictions for the years 1975-1990 is the same 
as that utilized by Blank et al (1996) and Levine et al (1996). I am very grateful to Rebecca 
Blank for sharing this data. The information is updated for the years 1991-1995 using reports 
by Sollom (1994; 1996)16,17. Briefly, the history of Medicaid funding restrictions is as follows: 
From 1974-76, Medicaid funding for abortions was generally available. Following the 
passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1976, 36 states also placed Medicaid funding 
restrictions, but between 1977 and 1980, the status of the laws were unclear, triggered on 
and off by a variety of judicial decisions. By 1981, however, the Supreme Court’s ruling gave 
states the full power to restrict Medicaid funding, and the majority of states immediately did 
so (in most cases, exceptions were made when the pregnancy was life-threatening or the 
result of rape or incest). A few states instituted restrictions in the late 1980s, while a few 
others instituted restrictions for a few years but then removed them. By 1994, just 17 states 
funded abortions for low-income women.d This legislative history creates a ‘natural 
experiment’. Since state gonorrhea rate data is available both prior to and after the passage 
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(or withdrawal) of the restriction, one can test if the restriction cause a change in the STD 
rates after unobserved state characteristics are controlled for with ‘fixed effects’.  
 
The one state that is hard to categorize is North Carolina, which makes available funding for 
abortion to low-income women, but does so from a separate abortion fund. Between 1978-
1993, this fund was sometimes depleted before the end of the fiscal year, and public 
abortion funding was suspended. Cook et al. demonstrate that this affected abortion rates 
and birth rates in the state. This unique situation – of funding being theoretically available but 
in practice occasionally suspended – makes it difficult to categorize North Carolina. Thus, I 
choose to omit the data for North Carolina altogether. 
 
3.3. Other Variables: 
The study includes additional variables that may influence state STD rates but may not be 
entirely captured by state or year ‘fixed effects.’ The choice of such variables is somewhat 
constrained by the necessity that  the data should be available for all of 1975-1995. Four 
variables are utilized: the percentage of state population aged between 15-19 years 
(teenperc), included because gonorrhea rates are highest among that age-group; the 
maximum level of monthly AFDC payments available to a family of three (adjusted to 1982-
84 dollars) (maxafdc), included because greater AFDC generosity might lower the 
opportunity cost of childbearing and hence promote ‘risky’ sexual behavior; and the minimum 
drinking age in the state (dr-age), included because Chesson et al (2000) find that that lower 
minimum drinking ages are associated with higher STD rates among youth. Finally, a control 
is used for the percentage of the state population eligible for Medicaid for reasons other than 
age and disabilities (medicaidperc). This last was included at the suggestion of a referee 
who pointed out that the passage of Medicaid funding restriction might be influenced by the 
size of the state population likely to be influenced by the legislation. If states imposed the 
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restriction only if the size of that population was declining, then the restriction would appear 
to have a smaller effect on over-all female STD rates simply because the share of women in 
the population whose sexual behavior could potentially be affected by the restriction had 
declined. This necessitates the inclusion of a control for the proportion of non-elderly, non-
disabled Medicaid recipients in the state population. A problem arises because state-by-
state data on people eligible for Medicaid funding by reason (age, disability, poverty) is only 
available after 1984.e However, data on the percentage of the population on AFDC is 
available for all necessary years. The correlation between percentage of population on 
AFDC and percentage eligible for Medicaid for reasons other than age and disability (using 
post-1984 data) is 0.882, and significant at better than 0.1 percent level. Also, the adjusted 
R2 from regressing percentage eligible for Medicaid (for reasons other than age and 
disability) on percentage population on AFDC, state-specific dummies and a linear time 
trend is 0.941. Hence, I address the missing data issue in various ways. First, I use actual 
values of medicaidperc for years 1985 onwards, and predicted values based on the 
regression for the prior years. These are the results presented in the paper. Next, I use 
actual values of medicaidperc for years 1985 onwards, and percentage of population on 
AFDC for the prior years, and finally, I use percentage of population on AFDC as an 
instrument for medicaidperc for all years. These results are discussed later with other 
robustness checks. Sample means for all variables are presented in table A in the appendix. 
 
5.  Empirical Results: 
5.1. The Model. 
Since gonorrhea is a communicable disease, its prevalence in any one period should in part 
be dependent on its prevalence in the previous  period. Hence, the model specified is 
Log STDjt = γ Log STDjt-1 + α0(Mfundrest)jt +  Xjtβ + ηj + µt + eit                           (1) 
And  
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Log STDjt = γ Log STDjt-1 + α0(Mfundrest)jt +  Xjtβ + ηj + µt + t*ηj + eit                (2) 
Where  
j = 1….51;   t = 75…95.           
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘partial adjustment’ model. The ηj denote the state 
dummies and captures all state-specific factors that remain largely invariant over time -- for 
example, the religious composition of the state population, geographical characteristics, 
population density etc. Moreover, the  state-fixed effects  also account for any systematic, 
time invariant differences between states in their policies for reporting gonorrhea rates. µt 
denote year dummies which capture factors that are common across all states in a particular 
year (e.g.  federal government policies, state of health technology etc). In recognition of the 
fact that unobservables in a state might change across time in ways that differ from other 
states, the model also includes the state-specific time trends t*ηj. ‘Mfundrest’ denotes the 
Medicaid funding restriction variable, 1 if funding restrictions are in place for that state for 
part or whole of that year, and 0 otherwise. Xjt is a vector of the other state level variables. 
An OLS estimation of the above models with the state dummies is akin to doing a standard 
fixed effects model. However, it is now well established in the literature that, because of the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable to the transformed error term, standard fixed 
effects estimators of models with lagged dependent variables result in biased and 
inconsistent estimates unless the number of time periods are large (see Nickell, 1981;18 
Ridder & Wansbeek, 1990;19 Kiviet, 1993 20) In this model, T = 20, hence the bias may not 
be negligible. An alternative method that wipes out the state effects is a first difference 
transformation. Because ∆Log STDjt-1 is still correlated with ∆eit , appropriate instruments 
must then be used as estimator of ∆Log STDjt-1 to obtain unbiased, consistent estimates. 
The estimator used here is the well-known GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) 21, 
which utilizes the orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged values of the 
 10
 
 
dependent variable and the disturbance eit , and uses as instruments for each ∆Log STDjt-1 
the set of variables ( Log STDjt-2, Log STDjt-3,……. Log STDjt-(t-1)).  Arellano and Bond (1991) 
clarify that absence of first-order autocorrelation is not a required condition for consistency of 
the GMM estimators, but it is required that there be no  second order autocorrelation.    
 
5.2 Estimation Results and Robustness Checks 
Prior to actually estimating the model, I do some tests for the validity of the data on STD 
rates. First, for the model to be meaningful, it is, of course, necessary that behaviors leading 
to unwanted pregnancies and to STD infections be positively correlated. One method is to 
find  what the correlation is between female STD rates and abortion rates in the absence of 
Medicaid funding restrictions.  I compute the correlation coefficient between the gonorrhea 
rates and the rate of abortions per 1000 15-45 year old women (based on data from the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute) using all pooled state-year observations when there are no Medicaid 
funding restrictions. The correlation coefficient is 0.689, and is significant at better than 0.1 
percent level, indicating a strong association between behaviors leading to unwanted 
pregnancies and those leading to STD infections.  Next, for the model with state-fixed effects 
to be valid, it is also necessary that there be within-state variation in the STD rate data. To 
test for this, I first adjust each state-year observation of (log) gonorrhea rates by subtracting 
from it the within-state mean (log) gonorrhea rate. 
Log STDjt - Log STDj(mean)       (3) 
One test for the presence or otherwise of within-state variation in the dependent variable is 
whether the mean absolute deviations from the mean for each state is equal to zero. 
Accordingly, I perform the t-test for each state to test the null that   
(Σ | Log STDjt - Log STDj(mean) |)    = 0.  where t = 75…95.   (4)                                  
  21 
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For each state I am able to reject that null decisively at better than 1 percent significance 
level (t-statistics are in table B in the appendix). This verifies that there is variation in the 
within-state STD rate data, hence it is suited for estimations using fixed effects models. 
 
Estimation results are presented in table 1.  Columns 2 to 4 present results using data from 
all states except North Carolina, estimated both with and without state-specific time trends.f 
The coefficients on Medicaid funding restrictions are found to be negative, but the effects fail 
to be statistically significant even at the 10 percent level. To account for the possibility that 
the effects of the restrictions on sexual behavior may manifest gradually over time, I re-
estimate the equation after including the number of years since the passage of the restriction 
(Length_rest), which is always 0 for states that do not have the restriction. The inclusion of 
a variable showing the length of restriction might be particularly important in a first difference 
model, where the imposition of a restriction (change of restriction dummy from 0 to 1) will 
show up as a one-time shock in the year of the passage of the restriction only. However, I 
still fail to find any evidence of the restrictions having statistically significant, negative effects.  
Thus far, therefore, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the restrictions 
reduce risky sexual behavior.  I also re-estimate the equations after including an interaction 
between Mfundrest and medicaidperc to see if effects of the funding restrictions vary with 
the percentage of the population potentially eligible for funding. The effects continue to be 
statistically insignificant (the t-statistic is always less than |0.90| in absolute value).   
 
Regarding the other variables, the high, positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
lagged (log) gonorrhea rates testify to a strong persistence effect, indicating that current 
prevalence is, indeed, highly affected by the past prevalence of  the disease. even after 
controlling for state and year effects. Higher monthly AFDC payments are associated with a 
weakly significant increase in gonorrhea rates, though the magnitude of the increase is very 
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small. A greater percentage of adolescents in the state population is associated with higher 
gonorrhea rates in some of the model specifications. The effects of higher legal drinking 
ages and percentage  of population eligible for Medicaid for reasons other than age and 
disability are both statistically insignificant in virtually all cases.  
 
It could be argued that a model specification that constrains the Medicaid funding restriction 
coefficients to be equal for all states, is overly restrictive. It might be hypothesized that the 
sensitivity of STD rates to Medicaid funding restrictions could vary based on the state’s prior 
STD prevalence. To explore this, I divide the states into two halves based on the female 
gonorrhea rates in the states in 1975,  and re-estimate the equations.g The results are 
presented respectively in columns 5-7 and 8-10. Again, in neither group do the effects of the 
funding restrictions appear to be statistically significant. Finally, it might be argued that, since 
many states started restricting Medicaid funding as early as 1977 or 1978, and since my 
data covers 1975-1995 (I do not have access to state specific data on gonorrhea rates 
among women prior to 1975), the funding restriction effects may largely be subsumed in the 
state-fixed effects for many states, resulting in their apparent non-effect. A way to test for 
this is to re-estimate the equations with a sub-sample of states that imposed Medicaid 
funding restrictions later, so that there is guaranteed within-state variations in restrictions 
available in the sub-sample. Accordingly, I select DC (restrictions imposed in 1989), 
Michigan (restrictions imposed in 1989) and Pennsylvania (restrictions imposed in 1985), 
and re-estimate the equations. The results are in columns 11-13, and continue to show no 
evidence of Medicaid funding restrictions exerting significantly negative effect on STD rates. 
 
All of the above equations were re-estimated using separate dummies for whether the 
funding restrictions were in effect for part of the year or the full year, as well as setting the 
funding restriction to ‘0’ where it was in effect for only part of the year. The equations were 
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also re-estimated using the two alternate measures for medicaidperc described earlier in 
the data section, and after including the data from North Carolina and treating it as a state 
without funding restrictions.  Numerous alternate specifications of the vector Xit, were tried  --  
omitting each variable in the vector alternately, including each variable by itself and omitting 
the rest, omitting  Xit, altogether. Equations were also re-estimated after dividing states into 
four quartiles (rather than two halves) based on 1975 gonorrhea rates.  Finally, all of the 
above were re-estimated using OLS rather than GMM.  In all cases, the effects of the 
Medicaid funding restrictions on gonorrhea rates fell well short of statistical significance even 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
While Medicaid funding restrictions systematically fail to have statistically significant impacts 
on gonorrhea rates among women, it might be asked whether the magnitudes of the point 
estimates are noteworthy. For the full sample, the point estimates show declines ranging 
between 2.4%-4%. It is difficult to make scientific inferences regarding what  percentage 
decline in ‘risky’ sexual behavior  these numbers would imply.  If there always existed a 
constant ratio between the rate of gonorrhea infection per 100,000 women to the rate of 
unwanted pregnancies per 100,000 (for example, if 200 cases of gonorrhea per 100,000 
women per year automatically  implied 400 cases of unwanted pregnancies per 100,000 
women per year ), then it could be inferred that percentage declines in gonorrhea rates are 
paralleled by the same percentage decline in the rate of unwanted pregnancies – in this 
case, a 2.4%-4% decline. But if this ratio were time-variant or were to change with the 
passage of funding restrictions, then such inferences would no longer hold.  It may be 
worthwhile, however, to compare the results here to those of the only other study in the 
economic literature that has used STD rates to proxy for risky sexual behavior.  Chesson et 
al, when estimating the impact of increased beer taxes on (log) gonorrhea rates using data 
from all states, obtained point estimates showing declines in gonorrhea rates of 16.7% for 
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women only and 25.4% for the full population. Thus, a simple comparison of  point estimates 
from the two studies suggest that, when it comes to reducing gonorrhea rates, Medicaid 
funding restrictions perform much more poorly than a $1 per gallon increase in beer taxes!  
 
6. Conclusions: 
This study has attempted to investigate whether Medicaid funding restrictions on abortion 
lead to adoption of safe sex behavior among women by testing whether the passage of this 
restriction impacts gonorrhea rates – a disease with a short incubation period that is 
transmitted primarily via sexual intercourse -- among women. The results of find no 
indication that Medicaid funding restrictions significantly reduce gonorrhea rates. Hence, it 
seems that such restrictions do not generate positive externalities in form of reduction of the 
cost-burden of STDs on society. The question of greater interest is, can it be confidently 
inferred from these results that such restrictions fail to effectively promote safe-sex behavior 
among women? While such an inference seems logical, some caveats might exist. It could 
be conjectured that the female population affected by the funding restrictions and those most 
prone to STD infections do not overlap, hence pregnancy-avoidance behaviors adopted by 
the former may not translate into observed reduction in STD rates. It might be speculated 
that Medicaid funding restrictions lead women to adopt pregnancy-risk-reducing behavior 
primarily in form of increased use of a contraception like the pill, which do nothing to prevent 
STD infections. A final caveat might lie in the nature of the data collection -- if there happens 
to be a change in the stringency with which states collect STD data that coincides with the 
passage of the Medicaid funding restrictions in those states, then that may also bias the 
estimates of the effects of the restriction. While the degree of feasibility of any  of the above 
scenarios is questionable, there does remain scope for further research on the impact of 
Medicaid funding restrictions on women’s sexual behavior using alternative methods. 
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Table 1: GMM Estimation results for Effects of Medicaid Funding Restrictions on (Log) Gonorrhea Rates for Different Groups of States.  
 
 All States  
(except North Carolina) 
States With Lower STD Rates in 
1975 b  
States With Higher STD Rates 
in 1975 b 
Michigan, Pennsylvania and  
DC c 
 β 
(t-stat)    
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
β 
(t-stat)   
Lagged (Log) STD Rate 0.870 
(35.60) 
0.587 
(14.65) 
0.587 
(14.64) 
0.831 
(23.23) 
0.505 
(10.22) 
0.503  
(10.20) 
0.827 
(21.56) 
0.581 
(11.01 
0.582 
(11.08) 
 
0.194 
(2.52) 
0.164 
(2.18) 
0.140 
(2.03) 
Mfundrest  -0.039
(-0.99) 
-0.028 
(-0.85) 
-0.024 
(-0.67) 
-0.108 
(-0.89) 
-0.058 
(-0.70 
-0.056 
(-0.10) 
-0.023 
(-0.64) 
-0.018 
(-0.52) 
-0.021 
(-0.62) 
-0.010 
(-0.17) 
-0.009 
(-0.11) 
-0.009 
(-0.09) 
Teenperc  0.009
(0.07) 
0.024 
(2.00) 
0.024 
(1.92) 
0.006 
(0.27) 
0.031 
(1.34) 
0.027 
(1.14) 
0.016 
(1.37) 
0.006 
(2.47) 
0.004 
(2.36) 
0.052 
(1.64) 
0.044 
(1.17) 
0.054 
(1.76) 
Maxafdc  0.0004
(1.68) 
0.0005 
(1.86) 
0.0004 
(1.61) 
0.0002 
(0.47) 
0.0007 
(1.84) 
0.0007 
(1.78) 
0.0004 
(1.47) 
0.0004 
(1.44) 
0.0004 
(1.45) 
0.0011 
(1.74) 
0.0013 
(1.85) 
0.0014 
(1.84) 
Dr_age  0.013
(0.87) 
-0.007 
(-0.56) 
-0.007 
(-0.50) 
-0.012 
(-0.86) 
-0.033 
(-1.44) 
-0.36 
(-1.56) 
0.010 
(0.87) 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
-0.0001 
(-0.28) 
-0.030 
(-1.33) 
-0.011 
(-0.80) 
-0.025 
(-1.20) 
Medicaidperc 0.006 0.016 
(0.69) (1.11) 
0.017 
(1.51) 
0.016 
(0.99) 
0.023 
(1.11) 
0.023 
(1.00) 
-0.007 
(-1.08) 
-0.006 
(-0.44) 
-0.005 
(-0.36) 
0.011 
(0.78) 
0.022 
(1.02) 
0.023 
(1.05) 
Length_rest           -0.019
(-1.22) 
-0.023 
(-1.26) 
-0.021 
(-1.26) 
-0.005
(-0.25) 
State Dummies 
 
Yes            Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies 
 
Yes            Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends 
 
No            Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Wald chi-sq 
 
2011.3             3392.6 3397.4 1072.5 1824.8 1829.6 973.8 1687.3 1694.3 158.6 162.1 -3.18
Test for Null of  
No 1st Order Auto-correlation. 
-12.09            -11.31 -11.28 -8.91 -8.64 -8.59 -7.15 -6.53 -6.56 -3.12 -3.17 -0.36
Test for Null of  
No 2nd Order Auto-correlation. 
-1.36            -1.51 -1.53 -1.12 -1.40 -1.43 -1.26 -1.29 -1.23 -0.21 -0.30 56
N 947           947 947 475 475 475 472 472 472 56 56  
             
             
Notes: All models are estimated using Arellano Bond’s GMM estimation method. Consistency of the GMM estimator is not violated by the presence of first 
order auto-correlation, but would have been had there been second-order auto-correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). b States are divided into two halves 
based on gonorrhea rates in 1975. For details of which are in which group, see endnote ‘e’. c MI, PA and DC are selected because they passed Medicaid 
funding restrictions in the late 1980s, thus permitting observations on STD rates for a number of years both before and after the passage of the restrictions. 
All models were estimated using OLS. Other robustness tests performed are described in the text. In all cases, the effects of the Medicaid funding 
restrictions fell well short of being statistically significant even at the 10 percent level. Those results are available from the author upon request.  
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 Appendix: 
 
Figure 1: 
Gonorrhea Rates for Women Over 1975-95
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Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, various STD surveillance reports. 
 20
 
 
  
Figure 2: 
Gonorrhea Rate Per 100,000 Women, 1995.
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Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1995 Surveillance Report. 
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Table A: Variable Means Using Pooled State-Year Observations. 
 
 
 
All States except 
 North Carolina 
 (N=1048)a 
States in Lower Half 
Based on Gonorrhea 
Rates in 1975 
 (N=525)b 
States in Upper Half 
Based on Gonorrhea 
Rates in 1975  
(N=523) 
Variable    Description Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Gonorrhea Rates 
 
Rates per 100,000 population for 
women 
 
269.65     225.25 145.90 88.01 393.87 251.20 
Mfundrest 
 
1 if restriction on Medicaid funding  
for abortion is in place, 0 otherwise. 
 
0.661  0.474 0.605 0.489   0.716 0.451
Length_rest    Years since restriction has been in 
place 
 
5.78  6.15 5.436 6.113 6.410 6.201
Teenperc 
 
Percentage of state population 15-19 
years old. 
 
9.631      2.317 9.536 2.087 9.726 2.540
Maxafdc 
 
Minimum drinking age 
 
 
20.05      1.268 20.06 1.240 20.02 1.297
Dr_age Maximum AFDC payment to family of 
three in dollars (CPI 1982-84 = 100) 
 
 
376.464      161.485 442.84 142.03 312.64 150.12
Medicaidperc Percentage on Medicaid for reasons 
 other than age and disability (actual 
values for 1985 and after, predicted 
values prior 1985) 
5.331      2.430 5.625 2.195 5.030 2.601
AFDCperc       Percentage of population on AFDC 
caseload 
 
 
4.907 1.723 4.861 1.572 4.702 1.861
     
Notes: Variable means by state are available upon request. 
a : Sample used for results presented in table 1. b Sample used for results presented in table 2.  
Predicted values of ‘Medicaidperc’ for years prior to 1985 are obtained by regressing values on and after 1985 on percentage population on AFDC, state fixed effects, and 
a time trend. The adjusted R2 is 0.94. 
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Table B: Results from testing for the presence of within-state variation in (log) STD rates. 
 
 
State T-statistic from testing 
(Σ | Log STDjt - Log STDj(mean) |) = 0. 
21 
State T-statistic from testing 
(Σ | Log STDjt - Log STDj(mean) |) = 0. 
21 
 
Alabama 8.428 Missouri 7.527 
Alaska 11.425 Montana 8.314 
Arizona 8.689 Nebraska 7.468 
Arkansas 5.874 Nevada 7.205 
California 7.675 New Hamp. 9.002 
Colorado 9.463 New Jersey 6.187 
Connecticut 5.957 New Mexico 10.298 
Delaware 5.344 New York 6.045 
DC 8.241 N. Carolina 7.533 
Florida 7.289 N. Dakota 6.959 
Georgia 4.496 Ohio 6.066 
Hawaii 11.509 Oklahoma 10.889 
Idaho 10.385 Oregon 7.973 
Illinois 6.397 Pennsylvania 5.012 
Indiana 8.231 Rhode Island 5.885 
Iowa 9.300 S. Carolina 8.645 
Kansas 8.918 S. Dakota 8.588 
Kentucky 11.365 Tennessee 9.228 
Louisiana 10.259 Texas 9.812 
Maine 8.537 Utah 9.667 
Maryland 7.019 Vermont 9.465 
Massachusetts 5.397 Virginia 8.260 
Michigan 5.566 Washington 7.175 
Minnesota 7.934 West Virginia 7.969 
Mississippi 7.130 Wisconsin 5.406 
  Wyoming 11.214 
Notes: This exercise was done to test that there is within-state variation in the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 23
 
 
 24
 
 
                                                          
 
a The author is grateful to Susan Clayton of CDC for help with acquiring data for STD rates, and to 
Rebecca Blank for generously sharing data on the dates of Medicaid restrictions in different states as well 
as longitudinal data on various state-specific variables. Junsoo Lee and Traci Mach provided very helpful 
suggestions regarding data and methodology,  Anna Kazandjan and Servet Ciltas provided valuable 
research assistance. The paper also benefited considerably from comments by two anonymous referees. 
The responsibility for all opinions and errors belongs to the author. 
b Women are the population of obvious interest here since they are more directly affected by restrictions 
on abortion. Parallel results for both genders are available from the author upon request. 
c The CDC obtains data for the actual number of cases of gonorrhea in total and by age, race and gender 
from the quarterly and annual reports from STD control programs and health departments from the 50 
states and DC. They transform this data into rates per 100,000 population using the intercensal total 
population estimates and estimates by race, gender and age for each state from the Bureau of Census.  
d The states where funding was available in 1994 were Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Vermont, Washington and West Virginia.  In Vermont, funding was available since 1983. In Idaho, 
Minnesota, Montana and Illinois, funding became available after 1990 by state judicial court orders. North 
Carolina funds abortions for low-income women from a separate state abortion fund, but has suspended 
this if the fund was depleted before the end of the fiscal year. 
e This data is obtained from various editions of The Green Book, and from the on-line state databases 
maintained by the Urban Institute (http://newfederalism.urban.org/nfdb/index.htm). 
f Statistical tests verify that state dummies are jointly significant, as are year dummies and the state-
specific time trends. 
g The states in the lower half are Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New York, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. The states in the upper half are Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, D.C., Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. 
